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Real Women: Objectivity versus Situatedness in Critical Discourse Studies 
Rowan R. Mackay, University of Edinburgh, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JS, 
email: rowanmackay@ed.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: This paper discusses the role of objectivity and interpretation within Critical 
Discourse Studies (CDS), arguing that the recognized and accepted situatedness of scholars  
has implications that are underplayed – to detrimental effect. Following Latour, and 
admitting the essential role of interpretation in all science, this paper encourages those 
working within CDS to engage more explicitly with their own roles as interpreters. Arguing 
for the importance and benefits of such a shift, the case is made for a re-appreciation of the 
role of interpretation in the rigorous and systematic analysis of texts. Drawing upon insights 
from translation, deconstruction, and hermeneutics, and analyzing a recent interview by the 
feminist, Germaine Greer, and the angry reactions it provoked from within the Trans 
community, I argue that CDS scholars should embrace the implications that undertaking a 
socio-political committed analysis brings with it. 
 
Introduction 
Within critical discourse studies linguists have, to some extent, engaged with the thorny topic 
of analyst bias, often in a caveated disclosure of interest and motivation. ‘We are all situated’ 
is a mantra to both humble and embolden: omniscience is not within grasp – for anyone. And 
yet there remains a disinclination to embrace what this acknowledgement of situatedness 
entails: we are interpreters, and what we, as academics, produce, are works of interpretation. 
Our interpretation can be the result of a systematic, rigorous, transparent, and repeatable 
process, but interpretation it is, and our interpretation at that. Another person, another 
analyst, following the same process, will not deliver the same conclusions – nor would we 
want them to. Discourse analysis – or ‘Discourse Interpretation’ as Bell (2011b) has 
suggested it be called – would be made stronger through such an acknowledgement.  
This paper argues for the importance and benefits of such a shift. Following Latour’s 
anthropology of science, the case is made for a re-appreciation of the role of interpretation in 
the rigorous and systematic analysis of texts. Drawing upon insights from translation, 
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deconstruction, and hermeneutics, and analyzing a recent interview by the feminist, 
Germaine Greer, and the angry reactions it provoked from within the Trans community, I 
argue that CDS scholars should embrace the implications that undertaking a socio-political 
committed analysis brings with it. This material was chosen for three reasons: first, it reflects 
a three-way disagreement among groups often defended in CDS work, but rarely when they 
are pitted against each other (a context which brings to the fore questions of analyst norms 
and motivations); secondly, it concerns questions of gender identity – a pressing and political 
subject that has been (and is being) shaken up by the increased awareness of the Trans 
community; and thirdly, because it has played a prominent role in the ‘no-platforming’ 
debate being had across university campuses, which goes to the heart of what academic 
freedom means, and is a subject critical discourse analysts must concern themselves with. 
The analysis – and a reflection upon the analyst’s role within and influence upon that analysis 
– is used to illustrate the main point of the paper: that the centrality of interpretation in our 
work needs to be acknowledged and celebrated to a much greater degreei.   
 
Theoretical backgrounds and positions 
Outline 
My argument in this paper is that although critical discourse analysts do not deny their 
situatedness and consequential lack of (mythical) ‘scientific objectivity’, neither do they tend 
to acknowledge the implications of this stance. I begin the literature review by discussing the 
motivation for the development of critical linguistics, how it was conceived of as a response 
to a removed, and disengaged academic field that was seen as failing to engage with the 
political nature of language – and the role of the linguistic in politics. I argue that despite this 
early recognition that ideology infuses all our language thus making each of us into situated 
interpreters, the challenge to the ‘scientific’ status of linguistics as a discipline was not made.  
Then, using insights from Latour, I discuss the myth of ‘Science’ as an objective method by 
which any interpretative input by the analyst-scientist is denied, and the (in Latour’s view) 
dangerous ‘ideal’ Science becomes conceived of as agentless, and ‘untarnished’ by the 
interpretive mind of a human, and the numerous translations involved in all scientific work.  
Having thus challenged the validity of the powerful, yet deeply flawed, model of Science as 
an objective and interpretation-less pursuit, devoid of translation (translation in this paper 
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taken in Latour’s sense, rather than in the narrower sense concerning rendering something 
intelligible and faithful in different spoken languages), I return to the scientificity of CDS, 
discussing triangulation and what it offers.  
Having done so, I address the central issue of normativity in CDS, suggesting that although, 
as van Dijk makes clear, normative judgments are not empirical (‘empirical’ being generally 
assumed to be a requisite quality of scientific work), deconstruction offers a method whereby 
our normative judgments can be assessed and accessed – van Dijk and Derrida sharing the 
aim of making them so. I also highlight Derrida’s view that it is incumbent upon the analyst 
to interrogate not only the make-up of the normative judgments we find deployed in the 
discourses we are scrutinizing, but also to interrogate our agentive role in the translation of 
what we find. 
In the second part of the literature review, I focus in upon Allan Bell’s (2011) paper in which 
he suggests renaming ‘Discourse Analysis’, ‘Discourse Interpretation’, and the responses to 
his article (principally those by Wodak, van Dijk, and Pratt) which cast light upon the 
discussion of scientificity, objectivity, and analyst motivation in CDS. To finish this 
discussion of the literature, I address the question of what responsibility we, as analysts, have 
if we do as I argue we ought to do, and engage more fully and openly with our roles as 
interpreters and translators. To support my argument, I use Lecercle’s work on the agentive 
dimension of translation, and Joseph’s concept of ‘hermeneiaphobia’ – the fear of 
interpretation.  
 
Critical Linguistics 
 In 1979, Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew published Language and Control. In the last 
chapter, they make the claim that there is a need ‘for a linguistics which is critical, which is 
aware of the assumptions on which it is based and prepared to reflect critically about the 
underlying causes of the phenomena it studies, and the nature of the society whose language 
it is’ (Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979, p. 186). In this, they lay the foundation on which 
the critical discourse analyst may, as van Dijk has done on numerous occasions, state the 
possibility of undertaking ‘socio-politically committed scholarly research’ (van Dijk, 2008, p. 
7), in which ‘scholars in CDS recognize and reflect about their own research commitments 
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and position in society’ (ibid). Ten years after Language and Control was published, 
Fairclough summarised the CDS methodological defence in Language and Power : 
The scientific investigation of social matters is perfectly compatible with committed and 
‘opinionated’ investigators (there are no others!), and being committed does not excuse you 
from arguing rationally or producing evidence for your statements. (Fairclough, 1989, p. 5) 
This defense was needed: the attacks were - indeed are - ‘routine occurrences’ (van Dijk, 
2008, p. 7), some more vitriolic than others: 
Fairclough […] in common with his critical colleagues, sets out to expose how language is 
exploited in the covert insinuation of ideological influence. But they do this by the careful 
selection and partial interpretations of whatever linguistic features suit their own ideological 
position and disregarding the rest. (Widdowson, 1998, p. 146) 
What seems to be at stake here is the legitimacy of a discipline - a discipline that calls itself a 
scienceii, or at least scientificiii - which admits into its ranks subjectivity and interpretation. A 
non-neutral analyst, politically committed, and, moreover, personally situated, is going to 
look at a text which is itself the product of a subject situated historically, socially, politically 
and institutionally: of what scientific value is such an interpretative analysis? Fowler et al did 
not overlook this ‘problem’, writing further: 
The linguistic analyses in this book differ from conventional linguistics and sociolinguistics 
in taking as their subjects real, socially situated and usually complete texts […] The texts are 
not appropriated as sources of data, but are treated as independent subjects for critical 
interpretation. (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 195) 
This critical interpretation has the motive of ‘unveiling’, of enabling a ‘demystification’ 
(Fowler et al., 1979, p. 196), the value of which is to offer up ‘a critique of the structures and 
goals of a society which has impregnated its language with social meanings many of which 
we regard as negative, dehumanizing and restrictive in their effects’ (ibid).  
And yet, in the very nascence of a critical linguistics - that disciplinary turn which would 
evolve rapidly into the multidisciplinary Critical Discourse Studies that we have today - is 
contained the germ of the problem. The germ is this: that despite recognising the place of 
interpretation, and despite recognising the situatedness of each of us analysts, the claim of 
legitimacy for our unique, informed, individual, situated analyses is not made. At the final 
hurdle, when there needed to be made a statement declaring the scientific value of a partially 
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subjective analysis, there was none. Informed, balanced, systematic and rigorous were 
necessary, but insufficient, qualities for a label of ‘scientific’. So all the features which apply 
equally to the analyst as to the analysed – being situated, influenced by their attitudes, 
ideologies, habitus – were recognised fully in regards to the text to be studied (in lexical, 
semantic, stylistic, structural and genre choices, implicit ideologies were ‘unveiled’), but 
were more or less brushed under the carpet when it came to the analyst-produced analysis. 
That is to say that the unique landscape between a situated-analyst and their situated-
analysed is overlooked. This, perhaps, was necessary: linguistics was partially aligned to the 
Social Sciences, and partially to the Arts. Fowler et al attempt to maintain a distance between 
the sort of interpretation which may be valued in the Literature Department, and the 
interpretation they are advocating. ‘Critical analysis’, they write, ‘should also be practical 
analysis. The critic ought not to be content just to display his own virtuosity (which is the 
case with most of what passes for literary criticism) but ought to be committed to making a 
technique of analysis available to other would-be practitioners; if the critic does not attempt 
this, his sincerity must be doubted’ (pp. 196-197). This technique involves, they state, three 
assumptions: the first is that the three functions – the ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and 
‘textual’ – of Halliday’s functional linguistics hold; the second asserts that participants in 
discourse (that is, the discourse to be studied, the object of study) make systematic choices 
based on their communicational purposes and ‘the social contingencies’ (p. 197); and the 
third assumption: 
states that the meanings are carried and expressed in the syntactic forms and processes, that 
is, that the analyst can ‘read off’ meaning from the syntax. (ibid) 
It is almost as if the analyst’s interpretative role has been reduced to an instrumental one: a 
‘good’ analyst is like a sensitive instrumental needle; they will pick up all the meanings to be 
‘had’ and convey them directly - unlike the speakers whose discourse is under investigation 
who ‘may act in confusion or with complex and even contradictory purposes’ (ibid).  
 
Latour and the rehabilitation of translation 
 To be a good social scientist, the analyst must be a straight, smooth, sterile, and inert 
conduit through which the ‘truth’ can travel, untouched by social factors. This purifying 
removal of all signs of agency is the mark of ‘the ’sanctioned’ sciences’ which ‘become 
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scientific only because they tear themselves away from all context, from all traces of 
contamination by history, from any naive perception, and escape even their own past.’ 
(Latour, 2010, p. 92). Critical linguistics is unusual insofar as it admits the impossibility of 
this scientific neutrality, although, simultaneously, attempting to fit within the unchallenged 
scientific paradigm. It is a perfect example of what Latour terms a ‘hybrid’ - the profusion 
and denial of which he has discussed in We Have Never Been Modern (1993). ‘Scientific’, 
almost by definition, meant ‘objective’; ‘objective’ meant ‘neutral’, and ‘neutral’ meant 
unsullied by human interpretation. There was an implied paradox in calling critical linguistics 
‘scientific’ for just this reason, an accusation which, by extension, threatened the scientific 
status of linguistics as a whole. Crystal, writing in 1971 about the disputed status of 
linguistics as a science (but for him the disjuncture was caused not by critical linguistics, but 
by Chomsky’s theory – see footnote i) makes the following remark:  
A new definition of science established by a field of inquiry purely for itself will 
inevitably incur the disapproval of other scientific disciplines, particularly of the 
philosophers of science: it will, indeed, be considered arrogant. But more important 
than this, a philosophical divergence of the kind involved […] is going to make it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for linguistic information to be ultimately 
integrated within the general framework of scientific knowledge. (Crystal, 1971, p. 
109) 
The compromise reached, by which critical discourse analysts could recognise in their data 
what they could not (openly) recognise and address in themselves as analysts, has allowed 
them to leave unperturbed the scientific doxa under which we (‘Moderns’ in Latour’s terms) 
exist, yet has also left them open to accusations of being non-scientific and hypocritical.  
By turning his anthropologist’s eye upon our own culture, Latour has laid bare the 
interpretative work which lies at the heart, not only of the arts, but also of the sciences. 
Science is work. ‘Distortion; transformation; recoding; modeling; translating: each of these 
radical mediations is necessary to produce reliable and accurate information’ (Latour, 2010, 
p. 111). Latour has adopted the term ‘double-click’ for the fallacious belief that Science 
could be, ought to be, and in its proper incarnation is, removed from all interpretation. This, 
he cautions, is disastrous not only for our state of knowledge, but also for our future. Of 
‘double-click’ he writes:  
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this Evil Genius is going to whisper in your ear that it would surely be preferable to benefit 
from free, indisputable, and immediate access to pure, untransformed information. Now, if by 
bad luck this ideal of total freedom from costs served as the standard for judging between 
truth and falsity, then everything would become untruthful, including the sciences. […] If you 
make the absence of any mediation, leap, or hiatus pass the one and only test of truth, then 
everyone, scientists, engineers, priests, sages, artists, businessmen, cooks, not to mention 
politicians, judges, or moralists, you all become manipulators and cheaters, because your 
hands are dirtied by the operations you have carried out […] (Latour, 2013, pp. 93-94) 
And what do we do, as analysts? What are our operations? 
 
Triangulation and checks-and-balances 
 The term ‘triangulation’ is used in a number of ways in CDS, all of which offer 
certain checks-and-balances: holding in check an analyst’s propensity to allow their 
subjective view to skew their analysis, and helping to balance inputs from theory and data. 
Triangulation implies a cross-referencing between independent entities and can apply intra- 
or inter- textually, within a single data-set or comparatively, performed by one analyst or by a 
number, using one method or a number of methods. The idea being to identify a number of 
independently reached, but comparable points, from which a convergence of views can be 
discovered – or not. To counter accusations of ‘cherry-picking’ – the less confrontational 
term used to sum up objections such as Widdowson’s – triangulation is used to introduce 
multiple perspectives and (usually) to demonstrate that they converge. To provide analysis-
internal consistency, for example, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) advocates 
constant self-reflexive shifting between four layers of analysis: i) the text-internal co-text, ii) 
the inter-textual level as existing, for example, between genres, texts, or discourses, iii) the 
extra-linguistic ‘context of situation’, and iv) the macro-level social, political and historical 
contexts informing the philosophical, political and cultural backdrop to the study. Another 
method of triangulation is the deployment of different methods of analysis, e.g. close textual 
analysis with a corpus-analytic approach (Baker and Levon 2015), and yet another is the 
multiple-analyst approach whereby more than one analyst analyses the same data-set and 
after this is done, the results are discussed, differences in findings addressed, and combined 
conclusions drawn. In their paper, ‘If on a Winter’s Night Two Researchers... A Challenge to 
Assumptions of Soundness of Interpretation’, Marchi and Taylor (2009), after arguing that 
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triangulation results can be either convergent, divergent, or complementary, conclude by 
encouraging the creative potential offered by triangulation: 
As Jick (1979) noted early in the career of triangulation, it seems to demand imaginativeness 
from researchers, and should not only be about fine-tuning instruments but also stimulating 
creative research. However, we would also caution that the implementation of triangulation 
within a research study in no way guarantees greater validity, nor can it be used to make 
claims for “scientific” neutrality (and perhaps, in the social sciences, we would add, not 
should it [sic]). (Marchi & Taylor, 2009, p. 18) 
 In CDS, the qualities of consistency, rigour, systematicity, and transparency of method are 
prioritised but, as Meyer and Wodak (2009, p. 31) note, ‘rigorous ‘objectivity’ cannot be 
reached by means of discourse analysis, for each ‘technology’ of research must itself be 
examined as potentially embedding the beliefs and ideologies of the analysts and therefore 
guiding the analysis towards the analysts’ preconceptions’. 
 
Questions of normativity 
Although not frequently discussed, the normativity inherent in CDS has been 
recognised:  
One of the tasks of CDS is to formulate the norms that define such ‘discursive injustice’. […] 
Such a research policy presupposes an ethical assessment, implying that discourses as social 
interaction may be illegitimate according to some fundamental norms, for instance, those of 
international human and social rights. (van Dijk, 2009, p. 63) 
The recognition that normative judgements lie at the base of CDS – are, in fact, required for 
the purposes of setting oneself against domination of various kinds – is possibly not given as 
often as it ought to be. That said, it is equally important not to lose sight of the fact that the 
motivation for developing CDS came from a desire to challenge the normative discourses 
which were – and are – contributing to the creation, perpetuation, and justification of 
attitudes and positions which have a negative impact upon, and (arguably!) damage, society. 
Herzog (2016) has recently engaged with this issue in some depth, arguing the case for 
immanent critique (as opposed to external critique which is what describes van Dijk’s 
position, or internal critique which is more or less the triangulatory method used by the DHA, 
with particular attention paid to inconsistencies and anomalies of argument). Immanent 
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critique seems to use the discrepancy between (culturally specific) norms and reality to 
ground judgment (a move which takes the DHA triangulation method and applies it on a 
cultural level). Fairclough too has engaged with questions of normativity and critique 
(Fairclough, 2015, pp. 12-13), and the role of analyst interpretation, although, resting his case 
on shared ‘members’ resources’, backgrounds the individual element of interpretationiv. 
In CDS then, triangulation attempts to limit the impact of an individual analyst’s bias insofar 
as that bias is seen to undermine or threaten the objectivity of analysis. The recognition of 
normativity, on the other hand, is an acknowledgement of an ethical and moral bias (the 
implication from van Dijk being that these norms are consciously selected) with various 
forms of critique being used to legitimate and – again – remove the subjective nature of 
analyst biasv. 
 
Universal rights and normative decisions 
 In an interview as part of the ‘Oxford Amnesty Series of Lectures’ (Derrida, 1996), 
Alan Montefiore asked Derrida to explain what he takes ‘to be the deconstruction of the 
subject, or what you take it to amount to, and why you see this not, in fact, as a threat, but 
rather, indeed, as a move towards strengthening our appreciation of the importance of 
protecting human freedom’. Derrida’s response aligns – and answers to – van Dijk’s point 
about normativity. Derrida is arguing against the accusation that the ‘deconstruction of the 
subject’ amounts to the ‘dissolution of the subject’. He says: 
[D]econstructing the subject – if there is such a thing – means first to analyze historically, in a 
genealogical way, the formation, the different layers which have built, so to speak; every 
concept has its own history, and the concept of subject has a very, very long, heavy, and 
complex history. (Derrida & Montefiore, 2001, pp. 177-178) 
Derrida and deconstruction have not been – as have Foucault and Critical theory – mainstays 
of CDS. But the manner by which Derrida problematizes not only the (normative) 
foundational concepts upon which CDS is based, but also the very process of taking, as an 
analyst, a subject as object of study, indicates, in my opinion, that a reappraisal of his (lack of 
a) role is overdue. He continues in his answer thus: 
If there are human rights, which means universally valid human rights, they should be 
accessible, understandable to everyone, whatever language they understand or they speak. 
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Now, if you try to make the word subject understandable in the culture in which the 
philosophical (Greek, German, Latin, French) tradition is not familiar, then the word doesn’t 
mean anything. Therefore, the first thing you have to do is a universal translation of what the 
subject is. So, deconstruction of the subject is first, among other things, the genealogical 
analysis of the trajectory through which the concept has been built, used, legitimised, and so 
on and so forth. (p. 178) 
This insistence on the importance of translation is also one which chimes with van Dijk’s 
insistence on making the work done in CDS accessible, not only practically (free to access if 
possible), but linguistically, avoiding ‘an esoteric style’ (van Dijk, 2009, p. 63). That esoteric 
style is one he associates elsewhere with people like Derrida (van Dijk, 2011, p. 611) and 
although Derrida’s (normal) opacity comes at a cost, it also has the benefit of foregrounding 
the process involved in academic writing (in a manner similar to Latour’s exposing the 
‘work’ of the scientist in the lab). The unveiling of all the translating and interpreting work 
necessary to address a problem, as to understand it, is what Derrida highlights with direct 
reference to human rights here: 
[W]hen you deconstruct the subject, you analyze all the hidden assumptions which are 
implied in the philosophical, or the ethical, or the juridical, or the political use of the concept 
of “subject”. As you know, what we call human rights is a set of concepts, laws, requirements 
which were not given in nature, from the beginning. (Derrida & Montefiore, 2001, p. 179) 
Here, then, we see the very make-up of the ethical position with which CDS associates itself 
held up to scrutiny and revealed as being – as van Dijk acknowledges also – not static, but 
changing and evolving, and always displaying multiple tones of meaning. Our role as CDS 
analysts is larger (by which I mean more potent) than we often take it to be: we choose the 
norms (by default if not by choice) by which we judge what or who dominates, and we enact, 
strengthen and perpetuate norms too in the assumptions we make as producers of academic 
output – particularly when we assume the role of objective social scientists.  
Bourdieu, another scholar whose work has yet to be taken up fully into CDS (c.f. Forchtner 
and Schneickhert, 2016) explicates the connection between the adoption of a scientific role, 
and the increase in symbolic power that follows. He writes:  
The scientific field is an armed struggle among adversaries who possess weapons whose 
power and effectiveness rises with the scientific capital collectively accumulated in and by 
the field […] But the specificity of the scientific field stems from the fact that the competitors 
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agree on the principles of verification of conformity to the ‘real’, common methods for 
validating theses and hypotheses, in short, on the tacit contract, inseparably political and 
cognitive, which founds and governs the work of objectification. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 113)  
 
The (scientific) work of analysts 
An issue of Discourse Studies (13(5): 2011) containing a focus article by Bell – ‘Re-
constructing Babel: Discourse analysis, hermeneutics and the Interpretive Arc’ – and nine 
responses to it, offers an insight into the subject of what those involved in critical discourse 
studies believe they themselves do, ought to do, and are partially defined by doing. Bell’s 
lead paper draws upon the work of Ricoeur (particularly his Interpretive Arc) to question ‘the 
aptness of ‘discourse analysis’ as a label for our field’ (Bell, 2011b, p. 519), preferring that of 
‘Discourse Interpretation’ on the grounds that it is ‘less reductionist’ (ibid) and more 
accuratevi. The four responses upon which I focus come from three different disciplines: 
Pellauer from philosophy, Pratt from literary hermeneutics, and van Dijk and Wodak both 
from critical discourse studies (from the cognitive, and discourse historical sub-areas 
respectively).  
First, however, I would like to quote from another response to the paper, this time from the 
discipline of history. Gardner starts his response with the following reflection: 
The history of academic neologisms tells us that the primary impact of Allan Bell’s 
thoughtful essay is unlikely to result in a lasting change in field nomenclature. This is 
unsurprising. Scholarly identities are deeply implicated in the names by which we have been 
accustomed publicly to announce ourselves and our interests. (Gardner, 2011, p. 575) 
This goes back to the earlier point made about the line consciously drawn between literary 
interpretation and critical discourse analysis: hybrids abound beneath the radar not only 
because, as Latour has pointed out, the Modern’s conception of societal progress demands 
(an impossible) purification, but also because delineated identities are tied up with symbolic 
power, in academia as in life (the binary Arts vs. Sciences, analysis vs. interpretation, but 
also the defining ‘History’, ‘Linguistics’, ‘Literature’, etc). The ‘residual force’ (ibid) of an 
established status also commands funding, and the ‘Social Sciences’ have worked hard to be 
in the position of having access to some of the ‘hard’, as well as the ‘soft’ funding pools. 
Pellauer, as a philosopher, asks the following: 
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If the goal is to introduce a fundamental shift in how the discipline of discourse studies 
constitutes itself through an acknowledgement of how interpretation functions within it, 
would it not be necessary to define the field as in fact a subdiscipline of hermeneutics and to 
show how discourse studies can be integrated into a philosophical hermeneutics? (Pellauer, 
2011, p. 584) 
In many of the responses to Bell’s article, the implication that an acknowledgement  of the 
role of interpretation would necessitate a re-classification, a re-centring, of discourse analysis 
is discussed – with a degree of anxiety. Pellauer, in discussing what an interpretative ‘turn’ 
would mean for Discourse Studies, draws upon the ‘classic model that any discipline is 
constituted by having three things: an object of study, a method, and a goal or purpose’ 
(Pellauer, 2011, p. 585). He notes that Bell only addresses the second of these three points, 
failing to adequately define ‘discourse’, and noting a rather vague goal of ‘increased 
understanding’ (ibid). Against this goal of ‘understanding’, Pellauer summarises two 
common criticisms: i) that it is too ‘mysterious’ a term, ‘one lacking precision and clarity, 
unlike explanation which seems to best characterize the natural sciences and still holds the 
floor ever since the logical positivists tried to give it a clear logical form’ (ibid); and ii) that it 
is ‘too psychological, which usually means something merely subjective where objectivity is 
the real desideratum’. 
This binary, subjective/objective, as well as the attributes of ‘precision’, ‘clarity’, and ‘logical 
form’, are crucial elements in this discussion and are taken up in the responses of both van 
Dijk and Wodak. Wodak takes time to distinguish between different theories of 
hermeneutics, identifiying both ‘objective’ and ‘critical’ hermeneutics as distinct from a 
‘classic’ hermeneutics. She aligns CDS with critical hermeneutics (largely derived from the 
work of Habermas) by, first, addressing the goal: to ‘demystify power relations and make 
these visible’ (Wodak, 2011, p. 626). This is not as open-ended (nor as ‘fuzzy’) as 
‘understanding’. Wodak explicates the critical approach by stressing the importance of the 
‘methodological trichotomy’ proposed by Apel, which makes necessary the triadic structure: 
‘when analyzing, we attempt to understand, explain and criticize communicative actions’ 
(2011, p. 627). Moreover, she adds, ‘we should certainly remain self-reflective in our 
research’ (ibid). This self-reflexivity lies at the crux of the matter. Yes, we can develop 
‘systematic’, ‘retroductable’, ‘rigorous’, ‘explicit’, and ‘transparent’ methods by which we 
undertake ‘empirical investigation’, but, at the end of the day, we must interpret the ‘results’ 
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in order to make sense of them. (We must also put an interpretation of what is and is not 
relevant into the processes we use to garner ‘results’.)  
We are one of the ‘filters’ through which the questions pass and the ‘results’ come, and each 
of us is uniquely situated – indeed, embodied – in culture, in time, in place, in history, as well 
as in our ever-evolving personal narratives. And we are agentive ‘filters’ as shall be discussed 
with reference to Pratt, below. Wodak makes the important point that ‘spatial and temporal 
relationships between texts always include relations of recontextualisation, whereby texts 
(and the discourses, genres and arguments which they deploy) move between spatially and 
temporally different contexts, and are subject to transformations whose nature depends upon 
the relationships and differences between such contexts’ (2011, p. 629). She says this whilst 
outlining the Discourse Historical Approach to discourse analysis of which she has been a 
pioneer, in which, to study a text, we must be aware of its past, and the past of the elements 
from which it is formed; ‘we can trace the specific context-dependency and discourse-
historical trajectory of recontextualised elements’ (ibid). My argument is that CDS would be 
strengthened if the attention paid to identifying the influences which have shaped the texts we 
study, was – to a greater extent than is presently the case – paid to ourselves and the 
influences which shape our interpretation of the texts – or our ‘reading’ of our results (which 
amounts to the same thing). The self-reflection Wodak also sees as necessary in CDS ought 
to be drawn attention to – be made explicit, and be made available to the reader. Although I 
regret the fact that the interpretative leap is assigned to a caveat by Wodak, I am heartened to 
find it mentioned at all: ‘every explicit and systematic analysis of a text or discourse will 
always entail an interpretive ‘leap’ when reconciling the analyses of the text and context. 
Nevertheless, such an interpretation should remain retroductable and transparent’ (2011, p. 
630).  
Van Dijk starts his response article with the following statement: 
It is not my habit to talk about my academic development in my scholarly articles, but on this 
occasion a brief personal account of some of my early research experiences may be useful to 
better understand my comments […] (2011, p. 609) 
Yes, I wholly agree. But why would this be so exceptional? Has not van Dijk’s academic 
development shaped his academic input throughout his career? Has not his habitus shaped his 
outlook, as well as his actions, as an agent, to alter, reject, or embrace those influences which 
he has identified as relevant to him and his work. I, for one, found van Dijk’s biographical 
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details interesting not merely in light of what he subsequently writes, but in light of what I 
know of his previous work. In all this, one thing becomes clear, and in Bell’s response to the 
responses to his article (appropriately enough!), he says the following: ‘[W]riting about 
discourse analysis or hermeneutics is an irreducibly reflexive business, a meta-discourse 
about the nature of discourse. The texts we write are subject to the very issues and processes 
we are describing’ (Bell, 2011a, p. 646). Drawing out the features which he feels are missing 
in Bell’s (and Ricouer’s) interpretive method, van Dijk highlights many of the aspects 
discussed by Wodak (e.g. systematicity, explicitness). He also introduces the notion that 
critical discourse analysis is, by its very nature, ‘more democratic’ in that it ‘develop[s] 
systematic methods of analysis that can be taught and learned by students’ (2011, p. 620). 
This is a very important point, and goes to the heart of the CDS as a ‘social movement of 
sociopolitically committed discourse analysts’. Van Dijk, whilst recognizing the brilliance 
and beauty of different interpretative works, stresses that CDS is ‘more descriptive and 
explanatory than normative. It does not tell readers how they should understand a text, but 
rather studies how different types of readers actually do so in different contexts’ (2011, p. 
612). And yet, when paired with the following, there seems to me to be an omission: 
alongside ‘hearer’ and ‘reader’, should be ‘author’; and alongside ‘recipients’ should be 
‘producers’ : 
Yet obviously a (same) discourse is quite differently understood whether the hearer or the 
reader is progressive or conservative, a racist or an anti-racist, a feminist or a male chauvinist, 
a socialist or a neoliberal. Hence semantic models are also influenced by the underlying 
ideologies of the recipients. (2011, p. 613) 
To equip the student in the most democratic way possible, it would surely be better to declare 
one’s interest as an analyst and, to the extent both possible and deemed necessary, furnish our 
students, our readers, our audience, with some information about us. For just as the reader’s 
semantic model is influenced by their ideological standpoint, so the analyst’s semantic model 
is influenced by their own ideological standpoint. 
This is not a simple exercise in divulging relevant biographic information about oneself; it is 
far more complex an issue. First, what we think relevant about ourselves may not be what a 
reader would find most enlightening, and how that difference is to be resolved is not clear. 
Secondly, the distinction between a professional and a personal persona may be desirable for 
a number of entirely valid reasons, and the select disclosure of information about what makes 
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us tick may conflict with those. Finally, our identities are not fixed, but rather fluid and multi-
faceted: we construct ourselves as well as being constructed by our past experiences, and in 
our work we may wish to take a stance (Jaffe, 2009) at odds with our ‘true’ selves – if we 
even feel that one of those exists. The solution to this quandary may be the following: we 
choose what to present of ourselves, and do so, making explicit what will aid the reader in 
situating us where we wish to be situated, and if that is not anywhere more specific than the 
‘academic we’, we draw the attention of our readers to this omission, and to the implications 
of our decision to leave certain aspects opaque, as opposed to transparent – transparency 
being the main characteristic differentiating the democratic approach CDS scholars aim to 
embody, and the opaque (yet stylistically brilliant) approach of those like Derrida (also 
Nancy, Cixous). We could also make more use of the position of Devil’s advocate, and 
challenge our best arguments with counter ones, bringing to the fore the weaknesses and 
limitations (but also thus the strengths) of our work. 
Pratt’s response to Bell is unique in the sense that she writes as ‘a scholar who came to 
discourse analysis from the world of literary exegesis’ (Pratt, 2011, p. 589), therefore 
travelling in the other direction from Bell. She asks what a hermeneutical approach offers 
discourse analysis and answers that it ‘enlivens the relation between discourse analysts and 
the materials they study’ (2011, p. 590). Hermeneutics enables a fresh ‘ownership’ (ibid) of 
the text, full of new possibilities and enabling us to transcend ideology. Within this classic 
hermeneutics, however she sees a gap: 
A key ingredient must be added to this script, however: desire. The interpreter is brought 
before the text by a desire, or a motivation, if you prefer. The desire may be just to find what 
this text says or does. But why this text? This genre? (ibid) 
A disclosure of desire is perhaps the most important step necessary to bridge the gap between 
the analyst and the audience, to making manifest the interpretive agent that is I. To reflect 
upon one’s desire is also to look into our motivations and these, in turn, help an audience 
place us deictically in relation to themselves. Pratt is right in seeing that for discourse 
analysis particularly, this is important. She writes:   
The interpreter is always looking for something, even if s/he has no idea what the something 
is. Ricoeur, or Bell, might want to say that the something is meaning itself, but this is not 
enough. The point is quite important with reference to discourse analysis, because usually the 
analyst’s desire is to reconfirm what is ‘known’: that prejudice exists, that advertising 
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manipulates, that newspapers lie, s/he will create (select or construct) a corpus that facilitates 
such a reading. (ibid) 
One way to counter this most common of criticisms leveled against CDS – that it is an 
ideologically biased exercise in finding what one wishes to find – is to embrace the role of 
interpretation. One can present one’s socio-political agenda – the exposure and critiquing of 
discourses of domination in society – and then rigorously, systematically, and explicitly 
apply the method that you have made democratically available for all to employ. If we, as 
critical discourse analysts, challenge the role the neo-liberal financial system plays in our 
universities, we, as politically committed social scientists, must invite those who disagree to 
use the same method to argue their case. This ‘uncoupling’ of CDS from the discourse 
analytical methods those who identify with it have developed, allows the marketplace of 
ideas and arguments to thrive. It is also more honest, in being more frank about the role 
subjectivity plays. 
 
Interpretation and responsibility 
Lecercle, in talking about translation, repeatedly alerts us to our active interpretive 
role which necessarily alters the text about which we write (or speak): 
We interpret the text by translating it into another language, usually a theoretical language, 
drawing inferences from hints which our reading selects in the text. There is more to this than 
the opening of a tin. (Lecercle, 1999, p. 6) 
In CDS there is an awareness that much lies between the lines; that ideology infuses language 
and that when we analyse a person’s language use and language choices, we need to attempt 
to understand the context – whether that be through an exploration of mental models (van 
Dijk), or historical discourse (Wodak). We could be those we study; we should treat our own 
language use as necessitating as complex an analysis as we grant others ‘under the 
microscope’. This is exactly the point Latour has been emphatic about: scientific ‘objectivity’ 
is not equal to ‘double-click’, or ought not to be. 
There is, in CDS, an awareness that the adoption of a ‘neutral/scientific’ stance is as 
ideological as any other. However, for analysts – and, no doubt – their readers, there is the 
easy ‘fallback’ position of the scientist as detatched and omnipotent commentator. Theo 
Hermans, in looking at translation in systems (from a point of view which sees all acts of 
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interpretation as translations of some kind), focuses upon the responsibility inherent in 
interpretation: 
The habitus concept stresses not only the structured but equally the structuring character of 
the ‘habitual’ practice of translating. Just as following a norm reinforces that norm, 
submissive translators play into the hands of custom and order. The reverse side of this coin is 
that translators can govern norms as much as they are governed by them. (Hermans, 1999, p. 
134) 
The symbolic capital and norm-reinforcement of a scientific translation is strengthened when 
it is paired with the ‘disinterested’ academic stance. CDS scholars share a commitment to 
challenge domination where it is found – and discourses of domination are often similarly 
characterized by custom and order. The guise of unmediated scientific enquiry – double-click 
– even if it is enquiry into discourses of domination, places the analyst within a normative 
discourse, which itself, I would argue, dominates by laying claims to a chimerical objectivity. 
In highlighting the norm-altering power a translation wields, Hermans mentions Venuti’s 
‘self-conscious, resistant translation’ (ibid). Despite agreeing with van Dijk that the 
hermeneutics of Derrida (and other, as he puts it ‘(invariably male) Great Masters’ (2011, p. 
611)) is undemocratic in its opacity of method, what can be said of Derrida’s work is that it 
forces the reader to engage with the struggles of the author, as well as engage with the subject 
matter with which the author is grappling. Simeoni, a translation-scholar who worked to 
incorporate and develop Bourdieu’s ideas, is also mentioned by Hermans: 
Simeoni discerns several possibilities for empirical translation research using the habitus 
concept. We could gain insight into the ‘sociogenesis’ of translating practices by focusing on 
the cultural group in which a translator received his or her training, and tracing the inculcation 
of a specialized habitus. (1999, p. 135) 
One such specialized habitus is that of linguists, who have laid claim to their corner of the 
domain of truth – an inheritance, Joseph notes, the roots of which were planted at a time 
when: 
[E]nquiry into language was not about the “trivial” matter of how ordinary people get across 
their desires and opinions to one another. It was instead about knowledge – something divine 
that is transmitted into the minds of human beings […] The desire for a true understanding 
links up with the search for an authoritative way of determining right and wrong in the 
interpretation of texts. (Joseph, 2010, p. 104) 
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Interpretation as a threat, and something to be feared, has led to what Joseph terms 
‘hermeneiaphobia’, a disorder that has led Linguistics to go to ‘extraordinary lengths to 
exclude or mechanise interpretation’ (ibid). The prognosis: 
Any project for an “inventive” linguistics must outgrow this primordial hermeneiaphobia and 
embrace the human dimensions of language, which are all about how we interpret texts and 
utterances, always individually, sometimes inventively; and how we interpret each other 
linguistically. (ibid) 
 For CDS to embrace such a project would involve turning our attention to ourselves (as well 
as to the discourses we wish to study), in much the same way as Latour has done for several 
groups (scientists, lawyers, theologists, etc.). The call for the critical discourse analysis of 
CDS has been made more frequently in the last few years (Billig, 2008; Cameron, 2001; 
Cameron & Panović, 2014; Chilton, 2005; Krzyżanowski, 2011; Shi-Xu, 2012), and this 
paper is part of that effort. 
 
Analysis 
Van Dijk  writes the following: ‘CDS scholars are typically interested in the way 
discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, 
and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse’ (2009, p. 63). Racism, 
sexism, Islamaphobia, anti-Semiticism, homophobia: different types of discrimination have 
been tackled in a wide variety of discourses, in numerous genres. More often than not, the 
discourses studied are complex in structure but (presented as) less complex in terms of 
whether they do, in fact, embody an abuse of power against a dominated group. For the 
purposes of this paper, however, I want to analyse a text which is less easy to categorise, and 
yet is clearly seen to be discriminatory, taken as anti-transgender, anti-free speech, and 
misogynist. Women, transsexuals, and those fighting for freedom of expression of thought, 
are three groups that CDS scholars would typically hope to support in their struggle for 
equality and freedom of expression. What happens, however, when these groups come into 
conflict, not with the ‘usual suspects’ – people whose discourses are (presented as), for 
example, racist, neo-capitalist, homophobic – but with each other? In such a case, the 
question of interpretation, and accepted – and desired – norms, comes to the fore more clearly 
than is often the case. Studying such a situation brings to the analyst’s – our – my - attention 
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not only their own role in and responsibility for the interpretation they produce, but also the 
norms which underlie their own and their subjects’ judgments and are privileged within them. 
Germaine Greer (GG) is a well-known feminist scholar who recently (re)entered the news by 
voicing her opinion, in an interview on the BBC’s Newsnight , that male  female 
transgender people could never be women: 
GG I’m not saying that people should not be allowed to go through that procedure. What I’m 
saying is it doesn’t make them a woman. It happens to be an opinion. It’s not a prohibition. 
Carry on if …if that’s what you think it is you want to do. (Benson, 2015) 
 
In a later interview, discussing the controversy which her earlier comments had caused, she 
said: 
Just because you lop off your dick and then wear a dress, doesn’t make you a fucking woman. 
I’ve asked my doctor to give me long ears and liver spots and I’m going to wear a brown coat 
but that won’t turn me into a fucking cocker spaniel. (Root & Greer, 2015) 
These comments, and others like them, caused great offence to many in the transgender 
community, one of whom, Rebecca Root, a transgender actress, was asked by Victoria 
Derbyshire (host of her eponymous TV show), concerning the comments: ‘are they as 
offensive as some of the worst racist comments that one might hear, or some of the worst 
sexist comments that one might hear?’ (ibid) to which she replied: 
Yes, yes, they are. You ask any trans person, trans male or trans female and they will tell you 
that what she has said is grossly offensive. (ibid) 
The first contestation, then, is whether Greer’s comments are discriminatory by being so 
insulting as to be transphobic. In her Newsnight interview, the presenter, Kirsty Wark (KW), 
asked the following: 
KW But for those who do not feel it’s been a disaster and feel more comfortable then do you 
understand that they might feel that you are being hurtful to them? 
GG (SHAKES HEAD) People are hurtful to me all the time. Try being an old woman! For 
goodness sake – people get hurt all the time. I’m not about to walk on eggshells.  
Going back to Root’s interview, when prompted further by Derbyshire: ‘So when she [Greer] 
says ‘it’s just my opinion, I don’t care’?’, Root continues: 
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Well, you know, people have opinions about race and the Holocaust denials and they’re not 
given a platform and those opinions are, you know, insane really. (Root & Greer, 2015) 
Here enters the second contestation: that Greer’s comments are equivalent to other speech 
acts which are liable to fall under the classification of Hate Speechvii, and their speaker ought 
not to be given a platform from which to voice them. Note, however, that Root describes 
these opinions not in terms of being illegal, but in terms of being insane (both illegality and 
insanity being grounds whereby an opinion may be disregarded and delegitimized). Greer, for 
her part, emphatically declared: ‘I’ve been accused of inciting violence against transsexual 
people – that’s absolute nonsense’viii (Benson, 2015).  
Payton Quinn, however, (identified by the Huffington Post as a ‘stand-up comedian, trans 
feminist activist and all round ethereal being’) argued the following: 
The response I have heard most often by far, from those opposing and allies alike, is that no-
platforming Germaine Greer is somehow infringing on her freedom of speech and that a 
debate or a protest would be a better option. 
I can understand how someone who refuses to acknowledge transphobia as an issue or has a 
lack of understanding of freedom of expression laws in the UK can come to this conclusion 
but hopefully I'll be able to clear that up for you. (Quinn, 2015) 
Quinn goes on to name Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘included 
in the Human Rights Act 1998’, and, recognizing also that the ‘right to freedom of expression 
is also a fundamental common law right’, argues the following: 
Although there is no universally accepted definition, hate speech is generally understood to 
describe forms of expression which incite violence, hatred or discrimination against other 
persons and groups, particularly by reference to, among other things, their gender. […] The 
European Court of Human Rights themselves have said on the matter: “It may be considered 
necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression 
which spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance.” (ibid) 
Still, Quinn holds back from suggesting that Greer ought to be taken to court, continuing the 
argument instead with the following: 
In Cardiff University's own policy statement regarding trans equality it states that they are 
"committed to providing an environment that promotes equality and eliminates discrimination 
for trans students and staff"; this includes the elimination of materials that "rely on or 
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reinforce stereotypical assumptions about trans people" or contains "transphobic material". 
On those grounds alone, it would be fair to say that Germaine Greer's appearance at a 
university event is against their own policy on trans equality. (ibid) 
Another well-known cultural figure in the U.K., the author Julian Barnes, entered the debate 
(or at least the headline for the article in TheTelegraph was ‘British writer Julian Barnes 
defends Germaine Greer’s controversial transgender comments’) insofar as he is quoted as 
saying of Greer’s opinion: “That is a perfectly legitimate point of view, seems to me” 
(Clarke-Billings, 2016). If  I presented the debate solely in such a way, one would be forgiven 
for imagining that there were splits along the demographic lines of age (Greer and Barnes, 76 
and 70 respectively) and/or ‘cis’ or ‘trans’ identity (‘cis’ designating people whose born 
sexual identity matched at birth their gender identity). If I, Rowan R. Mackay, was 
simultaneously assumed by you to be a white male (‘Mackay’ sounding rather Western, and 
potentially rather ‘white’, and ‘Rowan’ being more often a male name than a female one), 
would you, my readers, not read into my argument different things than you would if you 
thought I was a trans MF individual? And what if you (believed that you) knew that I was a 
cis-gendered, middle-aged, female? Following Pratt’s point: what is my desire in this study? 
Why this debate? Why this subject for discussion? It is not the habit of analysts to address 
these points in their published work. But, if we recall Hermans (and the insight gained from 
translation studies), through the (uncritical) adoption of norms picked up in our professional 
habitus, perpetuating those norms may (and I have argued do) obfuscate the fact that we are 
the opinionated agents (‘there are no others’!) offering individual interpretations, and being 
led by our own unique desires – which is not to imply that high standards regarding 
argumentation, methodology, relevance, and rigour should not (or cannot) be applied.  
Returning to the debate: if I – as analyst – introduce the voice of Rhyannon Styles, ‘Elle’s 
trans columnist’, and her opinion piece, ‘A Trans Woman’s Reply To Germaine Greer: 
‘Censoring her is not the right thing to do’’, I am clearly choosing to represent the debate in a 
different way: I aim to give voice to the opinions of those whom I find – and, once found, 
find compelling. Perhaps – indeed, almost certainly – there will be a person whose voice 
would add a level of nuance to the debate and yet who, in this analysis, shall not be heard 
because I myself have not heard it. Interpretation starts with choosing what is relevant and 
what is sufficient. Would my analysis be lacking in value if I chose not to include a 
dissenting trans female voice? What impact does making the decision to include such a voice 
have on my analysis, my representation of the debate? In one way, it adds legitimacy to my 
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analysis to a degree: I am taking another relevant view into account (relevance, of course, a 
normative judgment). In another way, depending on how I frame Styles’ contribution, I could 
be seen to be giving too much weight to the trans viewpoints, and not enough to the cis ones. 
In yet another, if I chose to give Styles a voice to showcase the weakness of the trans-female 
argument, I could claim to be giving free voice to an argument with which I disagreed. 
Styles’ piece starts thus: 
Last week, the famous second wave feminist Germaine Greer made headlines when she 
trolled the transgender community on Newsnight by telling the world, trans women are ‘not 
women’ because we do not ‘look like, sound like or behave like women. (Newsnight, 2015) 
Greer, the 76-year-old Cambridge academic, did not simply voice her opinion after being 
asked by the BBC (that airs Newsnight) for an interview at her home, she ‘trolled’ a 
community. The meaning of ‘troll’ is not clear here, and as a relatively new phenomenon, 
with a massively increased use based around describing cyber-behaviour, it continues to alter. 
Its meaning is used – and understood – differently by people of different ages (c.f Bishop, J, 
2014, ‘Trolling for the Lulz? Using media theory to understand transgressive humour and 
other internet trolling in online communities’), ranging from being interpreted as something 
akin to practical joking, to extremely serious harassment and threat. As I write my analysis, 
which of those meanings I choose (or possibly simply assume) will influence how my 
argument is constructed – and also how it is interpreted by my readers. If, for example, I 
assume an understanding of ‘troll’ which equates to ‘serious threat’, I may be somewhat 
delegitimized (or branded out-of-date, which amounts to the same thing) by readers who take 
the term to mean something far more lighthearted and playful. 
After describing her own transition, and the very great difficulties which went along with it 
(echoed by Root), Styles ends her piece: 
In the days since her quote went viral, a petition to stop Greer from giving an upcoming talk 
at Cardiff University has been circulating. But I don’t think censoring her is necessarily the 
best thing to do. It’s not about trans women vs. cis gender women. It’s about listening to each 
other and acknowledging our differences of opinion, because it’s from these disagreements 
that we ultimately learn from one another. We all have a voice. And as Greer needs to 
recognize, there’s room for all them. (ibid) 
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Here, then, we have support for freedom of expression (Styles also writes ‘she [Greer]’s 
entitled to her opinion. It doesn’t anger me, I can separate myself from her words’), an 
opposition to the call to ‘no-platform’ Greer, yet a refutation of Greer’s claim that a trans-
female is not and cannot be a woman.  
This already complicated matrix of identities, opinions, and claims to being discriminated 
against is made all the more complex by the third contestation: that it is misogynistic. The 
identity of ‘it’ here being both: i) Greer’s view that trans-females are not women, and ii) the 
assumption by M F trans people that an adoption of the cosmetic (and deeply so – 
including, therefore operatively altered genitalia) appearance of a woman, a woman makes. 
Styles’ summary of Greer’s comments is inaccurate: Greer does not, in this interview, discuss 
why M F transgender individuals are not and cannot be women. Knowing her argument 
helps: people – men (as she would put it) – who live the first part of their lives in the male 
patriarchy, experiencing neither the physical difficulties (menstruation), nor the societal 
difficulties (living as a woman in a male-dominated society), cannot become a woman. The 
early years’ experience understood as a mix of biological and societal factors is, for Greer, 
necessary – and, in fact, definitional -  to being a woman. She does not say that W M 
transgender people were never women, nor that M F transgender people did not have a 
very hard time growing up as men in society, so the (for trans-people, discrepant) emotional-
gender-identity does not play a role in her argument. Conversely, for the transgender 
community, this emotional-gender-identity – by which I mean what one feels oneself to be as 
opposed to either one’s sexual identity, or what one was raised as – is what truly defines 
one’s gender. The argument pivots on the meaning of ‘woman’. Quinn writes: 
If you believe that trans women are women, as you should because they are, then what 
Germaine Greer is espousing in her campaign against them is misogyny and surely no 
feminism should include any form of misogyny. (2015) 
Quinn inserts further nuance into the accusation prior to this by starting her article thus: 
So, notable second-wave feminist writer and scholar Germaine Greer is transphobic (more 
specifically transmisogynistic). (ibid) 
Greer, however, uses the example of Caitlyn Jenner to make her point about misogyny: 
 24 
KW /…yes, who’s been on the front of lots of magazines and apparently is – I think I’m right 
in saying – is getting an award for being kind of glamour woman of the year. What do you 
think about that? 
GG I think it’s misogynist. I think misogyny plays a really big part in all of this. That a man 
who goes to all of these lengths to be a woman will be a better woman than someone who is 
just born a woman. (Benson, 2015) 
Not one of these people cited attempts, in the texts analysed, to deconstruct what ‘woman’ 
means and yet it appears that the argument cannot advance without such a move. Greer is 
adamant in her intransigence: she has spent most of her adult life arguing for liberation 
feminism and is not about to allow men into her definition of women, finding the idea that 
men could appropriate the space women can call their own, and judge themselves to be 
‘better’ women, appalling. Those in the trans community, on the other hand, experience the 
deep irony of finding a hugely influential feminist being, in their view, misogynistic. I have 
elsewhere (Mackay, 2015) written about the extent to which a move for legitimacy 
challenges the status-quo definitions (which I termed deep legitimation), or, alternatively, 
argues to be included in the status-quo as it is already defined (soft legitimation). On one 
hand, the trans community challenges the status quo definition of what it is to be one 
particular gender (M/F), and therefore engages in an act of deep legitimation. On the other 
hand, as Greer notes in another interview:  
[W]e are wedded to sex roles, we love them […] even things like transgender, they’re not 
fighting against a sex role, they started off with one, they started off as Ken, and then they 
want to become Barbie, but actually, we live in the middle, and we’d quite like our roles to be 
less sharply differentiated. (Cook, 2015) 
In challenging the well-established M/F binary – which the trans community (here, at least) 
accepts – Greer is also involved in deep legitimation and her rejection of equality- as opposed 
to liberation- feminism is deeply challenging to the status quo. 
 
Conclusion 
Here are three groups claiming systemic, unfair societal treatment – feminists, 
transgender people, and those in favour of freedom of speech – all three of which align well 
with the community aims of CDS: to be ‘sociopolitically committed to social equality and 
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justice […] typically [being] interested in the way discourse (re)produces social domination, 
that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may 
discursively resist such abuse’ (van Dijk, p.63). By using this example, I hope to have 
foregrounded the primary and inevitable role that subjective interpretation has in CDS 
specifically, but in all academic work – hard Science included. Bringing together insights 
taken from CDS scholars’ reflections on their own work, Latour, Bourdieu, and Derrida, as 
well as some insights from Interpretation Studies, and Hermeneutics, I have argued that 
recognizing the place of interpretation does not invalidate our analyses, but in fact, makes 
them stronger, more democratic, and ultimately, more honest. And my own desire? To 
challenge the practice of no-platforming people whose voices may offend but whose opinions 
are necessary to hear for full and open debate to occur.  
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explicitness, systematicness, and objectivity – the qualities which are ‘generally agreed outside linguistics (and 
for many linguists too, of course)’ to be necessary ‘for any enterprise to qualify as scientific’ (Crystal, 1971, p. 
78). Note the ‘outside linguistics’: Crystal argues that Chomsky’s proposed transformational-generative theory 
has challenged this received view by placing at its explanatory core a role for intuition (ibid, p.107). Crystal 
writes: ‘The difference between the two linguistic approaches is not so much a question of their use of empirical 
data, as of what other kinds of data can also be legitimately introduced; and it is the claims which seem to be 
being made here which strike the outsider as being tantamount to a radical redefinition of the term ‘science’’ 
(ibid.). 
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which would combine, with each individual, to create a unique set; and it would be this set of resources which 
each individual would have access to. 
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Schneickert (2016). 
vi Bell’s paper also offers, by way of illustration, a detailed hermeneutic analysis of the story of Babel which 
informs the responses given to his paper. I do not engage with these here. 
vii The Independent ran with the headline: ‘Germaine Greer 'should not be invited back' to Cambridge University 
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distress, altered in 2014, from ‘(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he— (a) uses threatening, abusive or 
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(a) uses threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or […]’. ("Public Order Act 1986," 
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